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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
EuGexB F. RoGems*
I. INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
By far the most important development in criminal law in
South Carolina during the review period was caused by Gideon v.
Wainwright,' arising in Florida and going to tile United States
Supreme Court via the route of certiorari. Since March 18, 1963,
the date of this decision, the lawyers and General Sessions judges
of the state have been faced with the problem of assuring repre-
sentation to every indigent defendant accused of crime. In this
now celebrated case Gideon was charged in a Florida state court
with having broken and entered a pool room, a felony under
Florida law. He appeared in court without funds and without
a lawyer and asked the court to appoint counsel for him. The
court declined his request because under the laws of Florida the
only time an indigent defendant is entitled to court-appointed
counsel is when charged with a capital offense. Gideon was put
to trial before a jury and conducted his own defense. He was
convicted and sentenced to serve five years in the state prison.
He later filed a petition in the Florida Supreme Court for a
writ of habeas corpus attacking his conviction and sentence on
the ground that the trial court's refusal to appoint counsel for
him denied him rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights. The Florida Supreme Court denied relief and up-
on appeal to the United States Supreme Court certiorari was
granted. After argument the Court held that the sixth amendment
to the federal constitution, providing that in all criminal prosecu-
tions the accused should enjoy the right to assistance of counsel
for his defense, was made obligatory on the states by the four-
teenth amendment and that an indigent defendant in a criminal
prosecution in a state court has the right to have counsel appointed
for him. The Court concluded that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries. The Court said:
... reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.
2
* Member of the firm of Rogers & McDonald, Columbia, South Carolina.
1. 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed 2d 799 (1963). This case is also noted in the
Constitutional Law section at note 20.
2. Id. at 344, 9 L. Ed at 805.
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The Court went on to say in quoting from Powell v. Alabamz :8
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little
avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar
with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel
he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and con-
victed upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to
the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.
4
The effect of this decision in South Carolina has been to re-
quire the appointment of counsel in all cases where a defendant
is financially unable to employ one. On its authority, new trials
have been granted to some defendants who were tried before
the decision without counsel. Few lawyers in the state have
escaped appointment. In many counties, duties imposed by the
cases have become extremely burdensome. This burden has be-
come so great that some bill will probably be introduced in the
Legislature during the coming year providing for either a public
defender system or for compensation to counsel in appointed
cases.
II. RIGHT TO COUNSEL-WAIVER
In Pitt v. State,5 the Supreme Court in a prisoner's habeas
corpus proceeding concluded that the defendant had waived his
right to counsel. The defendant was not illiterate, was above
average intelligence, understood his rights but chose to go to
trial without the aid of counsel when given an opportunity to
procure one. Our court concluded that the right to counsel could
be waived by a defendant if intelligently and understandingly
done.
3. 287 U.S. 45, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932).
4. Id. at 68, 69, 77 L. Ed. at 170.
5. 240 S.C. 557, 126 S.E.2d 579 (1962). This case is also noted on in the
Constitutional Law section at note 17.
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2
South Caroli a Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol16/iss1/8
SuRvEy oF SouTH CAxoimA LAw
III. RIGHT OF INDIGENT TO
STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL
Another case arising outside of South Carolina which could
have some effect on the criminal law of the state is Draper v.
State of Washington.0 The defendant was convicted in the state
of Washington of robbery and applied for a free transcript. The
Washington Court concluded that the defendant's exceptions
were frivolous and denied to petitioner a free transcript of the
record. On appeal to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari,
review was granted and it held that the conclusion of a trial
judge that an indigent's appeal was frivolous was an inadequate
substitute for full appellate review available to nonindigents and
the case was reversed. The Supreme Court was careful to point
out that the state need not supply a stenographer's transcript in
every case where a defendant cannot buy it, but that an equiva-
lent report of the events at trial is necessary for an indigent de-
fendant. The Court concluded that it was the duty of the state
to provide an indigent as adequate and effective an appellate re-
view as that given appellants with funds, holding that the state
must provide the indigent defendant with means of presenting
his contentions to the appellate court which are as good as those
available to a nonindigent defendant with similar contentions.
From a careful review of the case, it appears that the state's only
defense to a request for a free transcript of record or its equal
would be that the defendant was able to purchase it.
In South Carolina two cases were decided involving free tran-
scripts during the review period. In State v. Bishop7 the defend-
ant was denied his motion for a free stenographic transcript of
the record of trial and an appeal from the decision denying the
motion was decided adversely to the defendant. The matter was
heard by the resident judge of the Seventh Circuit who said the
following in denying the motion:
After reviewing the record and hearing argument of counsel,
I conclude that this defendant is employed, and though he
may not have an abundance of finances, I conclude that he
would elect to spend what money he does have for things
other than the transcript of record.8
6. 372 U.S. 487, 9 L. Ed. 2d 899 (1963).
7. 241 S.C. 459, 128 S.E.2d 914 (1962).
8. Id. at 460, 128 S.E2d at 914.
1963]
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Our court concluded that where a defendant is in fact indigent
there is a duty to provide a transcript but that the question of
whether or not he is indigent is one for the circuit court judge
to decide and if it appears that he is able to purchase for himself
a transcript, there is no duty on the state to provide for one.
In State v. Johnson,9 an indigent defendant applied for a tran-
script of trial. The transcript was denied on the ground that the
time for appealing had expired and that no facts were alleged
which would permit attack upon conviction in a collateral pro-
ceeding. Upon appeal our court held that the defendant, who was
represented by himself, did not argue exceptions which he had
made to the order refusing the transcript and his appeal was
dismissed on the ground that exceptions not argued were deemed
abandoned.
IV. GRAND JURY-JURY LIST
In State v. Jackson,'0 the defendant, who was being prosecuted
for murder, moved to quash the indictment on the grounds that
the grand jury was illegally constituted because the statutory
requirement that the jury commissioners prepare a list of pro-
spective jurors including not less than two from every three
qualified electors was disregarded by officials. The motion was
granted and the state appealed. It appeared that the Anderson
County jury commissioners had in the box some 2,700 names out
of a possible 15,000 male electors. The commissioners contended
that additional names were not in the box because (1) it was
made back in W.P.A. days and was not large enough to accom-
modate the proper number of capsules, and (2) there were not
enough capsules available of the type in use in Anderson County.
The court concluded that these reasons were wholly insufficient
in law for not having a proper jury list and that the result was
an unlawful jury list which was subject to timely challenge.
This appears to be an important case and indicates that the
requirements of Section 38-52 of the Code will be enforced by the
court. Jury commissioners should take note of this decision.
V. VENUE
The defendant in State v. Gasque,"' was prosecuted on charges
of filing false income tax returns. The indictment was returned
9. 241 S.C. 366, 128 S.E.2d 664 (1962).
10. 240 S.C. 238, 125 S.E.2d 474 (1962).
11. 241 S.C. 316, 128 S.E.2d 154 (1962).
[Vol. 16
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in Richland County and upon the call of the case the defendant
moved to quash the indictment on the ground that the tax returns
were filed within Marion County by the taxpayer and that if
there were any offense, it was committed entirely within Marion
County. The taxpayer was a resident of Marion County, received
all his income in the county and prepared, made, signed and de-
livered the tax returns in Marion County to an agent of the Tax
Commission.
The motion to quash the indictment was based on article 1,
section 17 of the South Carolina Constitution, which provides:
No person shall be held to answer for any crime where the
punishment exceeds a fine of one hundred dollars or im-
prisonment for thirty days, ... unless on a presentment or
indictment of a grand jury of the County where the crime
shall have been committed,...
The court concluded that every act with which the respondent
was charged as constituting a violation of the section requiring
the filing of tax returns took place in Marion County and that
the proper place for indictment would be in Marion County. The
decision of the lower court was affirmed on appeal.
VI. FRAUDULENT SECURITIES SALES
In State v. Homewood, 2 the defendant was convicted of
violating a statute prohibiting fraud and misrepresentation in
the sale of securities. On appeal the defendant contended that he
had only failed to disclose material facts relative to the stock and
that this failure did not constitute an offense under Section 62-
306 of the 1962 Code. The court concluded that this argument
was without merit and held that it was unlawful to use or employ
any fraud or fraudulent practice in connection with the sale of
securities whether or not the conduct of the party charged with
violation involved any affirmative false pretense, representation
or promise.
VII. IMPARTIAL TRIAL
In United States v. CampbeZ113 the defendant was convicted
in the United States District Court of concealing and removing
nontax-paid whiskey and he appealed. During the trial of the
12. 241 S.C. 231, 128 S.E.2d 98 (1962).
13. 316 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1963).
1963]
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case but out of the presence of the jury the court made the fol-
lowing comments:
The Court: I never knew a Campbell in my life that wasn't
in the liquor business . . . As a matter of fact, I defended
them all. When I was at the bar, I defended all the Camp-
bells in the liquor business; and after I got to be District
Attorney, I prosecuted all the Campbells; and now that I
have been a judge, I have been trying Campbells 25 years
as a judge. 1
4
Later on the court had this to say in connection with the de-
fendant's being in a house when an alleged sale was made:
The Court: What would you think a Campbell would have
been doing there with that liquor if he wasn't partici-
pating?1
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a new trial on
other grounds and made no decision as to whether or not these
comments were so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. It made
the following observation about the Judge's comments:
It suggests, however, that the District Judge may have been
convinced of the defendant's guilt before the trial com-
menced, and the defendant complains that this was made
evident to the jury in a number of remarks and rulings in
the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury. We
need not detail the instances upon which this contention is
based or consider whether, in the absence of any other reason
for granting a new trial, they alone were so prejudicial as to
warrant the granting of a new trial. The defendant, how-
ever, is entitled to be tried in an atmosphere in which he may
receive the full benefit of the presumption of innocence to
which he is entitled. Under the circumstances, since a new
trial must be granted because of the peremptory instruction
which foreclosed the jury's choice of permissible but conflict-
ing inferences, we think that the new trial should be before
some other district judge whose contacts with the defendant
and his relatives have been less extensive.'"
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id. at 9.
16. Id. at 9.
[Vol. 16
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VIII. HUSBAND AND WIFE
In State v. Campbell,17 the defendant was convicted upon a
charge of failure to support his wife. An appeal to the Supreme
Court ensued and the defendant contended that he had been
prejudiced by the failure of the trial judge to permit the in-
troduction of a Georgia divorce decree. It was his contention
that a valid decree of divorce afforded him immunity from
prosecution for nonsupport. The court agreed, finding: "A valid
decree of divorce affords the husband immunity from prosecution
for abandonment and nonsupport" and concluded that the trial
judge should have admitted into evidence the exemplified copy
of the divorce proceedings of the Georgia Court when such was
offered in evidence by the appellant. The court decided that
the mere offering of this proceeding did not prove that it was
valid and that it could be impeached by a showing that the
courts of Georgia had not acquired jurisdiction to grant the
divorce. It was, however, error to refuse to admit it in evidence
and the judgment of the lower court was reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial.
IX. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-RIGHT OF THE
LEGISLATURE TO PERMIT DIRECTOR OF
THE STATE PENITENTIARY TO PRESCRIBE
REGULATIONS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF
CERTAIN LAWS
In Cole v. Manning,"' Cole, the defendant, was convicted of
conspiracy to violate Section 55-14 the 1952 Code by furnishing
the prisoners in the state penitentiary certain drugs which had
been declared contraband by the Director of Prisons. It was
his contention that the section in question unlawfully delegated
legislative power to the director of prisons. He contended that
the section provided no standard by which the Director was to
be guided in determining what things he might declare contra-
band and that the matter, left to his absolute unregulated and
undefined discretion, gave to an administrative agency the power
to make laws. The court rejected petitioners' argument and said:
17. 242 S.C. 64, 129 S.E.2d 902 (1963). This case is also noted in the
Domestic Relation section at note 1.
18. 240 S.C. 260, 125 S.E.2d 121 (1963). This case is also noted in the
Administrative Law section beginning at note 10, and in the Constitutional
Law section at note 28.
1963]
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It is elementary that the legislature may not delegate to an
administrative agency its power to make laws. But no vio-
lence is done to the principle of separation of governmental
powers when a law, complete in itself, declaring a legislative
policy and establishing primary standards for carrying it
out, or, with proper regard for the protection of the public
interest and with such degree of certainty as the case permits,
laying down an intelligible principle to which the adminis-
trative agency must conform, delegates to the agency the
power to prescribe regulations for the administration and
enforcement of that law within its expressed general pur-
pose.19
X. CIVIL RIGHTS
During the review period five cases involving civil rights were
heard by the South Carolina Supreme Court. Four of the cases
were reversed altogether or in part and one of the cases was
affirmed.
In State v. Brown, °2 0 Mr. Justice Lewis had this to say:
The defendants have the constitutional right to freedom of
speech, assembly and to petition for redress of grievances.
The fact that the defendants may have been at the time of
their arrests attempting to assert such constitutional rights
does not answer the question here. While the state must safe-
guard the constitutional rights of the defendants, it also
has a duty to preserve the public peace and to assure the
availability of the streets to serve the necessary requirements
of the community. The constitutional guarantees which, ad-
mittedly, the defendants have a right to enjoy may not be as-
serted in any manner, regardless of any resulting peril to
the community therefrom. The constitutional principles here
invoked do not prohibit state action when a clear and present
danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the
public streets, or other immediate threat to public peace or
order appears.
The defendants were engaged at the time in expressing their
opposition to racial segregation. The question of racial prac-
tices is a present and perplexing one, involving deep seated
19. Id. at 264, 125 S.E.2d at 623.
20. 240 S.C. 357, 126 S.E.2d 1 (1962).
[Vol. 16
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feelings and beliefs. Where issues are involved which so
deeply affect the feelings and emotions of a people, incidents
often precipitate open conflict which in other situations
would go unnoticed. In urging the adoption of one's views
it must be recognized that the constitutional right exists to
oppose as well as to espouse a cause. It is clear, however, that
unpopular views may not be silenced under the guise of the
preservation of order. In the conflict of opposing ideas the
rights of the contending factions must be balanced if the
state is to exist and the constitutional rights of all pre-
served. Therefore, the principle has become fixed that, in
exercising the rights guaranteed under the Constitution, one
may not commit a breach of the peace. This is not a denial
of those rights but rather a recognition that they can only
exist in an orderly society.
21
In City of Florence v. George,2 2 the defendants were convicted
in the General Sessions Court of Florence County of violation of
an ordinance prohibiting staging of a parade on the public streets
without obtaining a permit from the chief of police. The ordi-
nance permitted the chief of police to absolutely deny such a per-
mit. The ground of the appellants' appeal was principally that
the ordinance was unconstitutional because it made the peaceful
enjoyment to the right of freedom of speech and assembly upon
the public streets of the City of Florence contingent upon the un-
controlled will or whim of the chief of police, vesting in him the
absolute power to permit or deny the right. Our court concluded
that the City of Florence had the right of control but questioned
that it was exercised in the proper manner in this instance. The
court concluded that it was unconstitutional and reversed the
lower court.
In City of Sumter v. LeWis, 23 the defendants were convicted
of breach of the peace and appealed. The breach of the peace
complained of consisted of the defendants walking on the side-
walk in a single file carrying placards protesting racial segre-
gation but making no noise and not obstructing traffic.
The court concluded that there was no overt act indicating
tension, that no noise was being made, no traffic was being ob-
21. Id. at 363, 364, 126 S.E2d at 4.
22. 241 S.C. 77, 127 S.E.2d 210 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Administrative Law section at note 43 and in the Constitutional Law section
at note 15.
23. 241 S.C. 364, 128 S.E2d 684 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Constitutional Law section at note 8.
1963]
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structed and concluded that this conduct did not support the
charge of breach of the peace and reversed the lower court.
CIVIL RIGHTs-REsISTING AmREST
In City of Sumter v. Gregg,24 the defendants were convicted
on the charge of resisting arrest in violation of a city ordinance.
The ordinance made it unlawful to resist arrest or interfere with
any police officer of the ity while in the discharge of his duty.
The evidence showed that the arresting officer was an officer
of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division and one or
more deputy sheriffs of the County of Sumter. The record no-
where indicated that a city police officer participated in the
arrest. The court reversed the decision of the Court of General
Sessions on the ground that the act complained of was not en-
compassed by the terms of the ordinance.
XI. VOIR DIRE IN MAGISTRATES' COURT
In State v. Brown,25 trial by jury was demanded and an
examination of prospective jurors on their voir dire was requested.
The magistrate refused to examine the jurors on their voir dire
and this refusal was cited as grounds for reversal of the verdict
of the jury. Our court said:
Examination of prospective jurors on their voir dire is a
guaranty of the right of the parties to an impartial jury.
And, when timely request was made, it became the duty of
the Magistrate to make reasonable inquiry of the jurors to
determine whether bias or prejudice existed, to the end that
the constitutional right of the litigants to a trial by an im-
partial jury could be secured.20
In City of Rock Hill v. Henry,2 7 the defendants were convicted
of breach of the peace and appealed. The breach of the peace
complained of was the singing of patriotic and religious songs
in a loud and boisterous manner and in such fashion that work
in the city hall was disrupted. The court, in refusing to reverse
the conviction, stated:
24. 241 S.C. 409, 128 S.E.2d 685 (1962).
25. Supra note 20.
26. 240 S.C. 357, 365, 126 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1962).
27. 241 S.C. 427, 128 S.E.2d 775 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Constitutional Law section at note 9.
[Vol. 16
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Appellants were not convicted under a statute designed to
perpetuate segregation but were convicted of the common law
offense of breach of peace, and this applies to any person ir-
respective of race. The singing of patriotic songs and re-
ligious hymns is, of course, not unlawful if done in a lawful
manner, but even such praiseworthy acts may be done at a
time and place and in such manner as to be unjustifiable and
unlawful resulting in a breach of the peace.
28
A number of other cases were presented to the court, argued
and decisions made during the review period. None of these
cases have pronouncements of any new principles and were not of
such significance as to permit a detailed review of them here.
28. Id. at 429, 128 S.E.2d at 776.
1963]
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